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We can recognize thousands of individual objects in scores of familiar settings, and
yet we see most of them only through occasional glances that are quickly forgotten.
How do we come to recognize any of these objects? Here, we show that when objects
are presented intermittently for durations of single fixations, the originally fleeting
memories become gradually stabilized, such that, after just eight separated fixations,
recognition memory after half an hour is as good as during an immediate memory
test. However, with still shorter presentation durations, memories take more expo-
sures to stabilize. Our results thus suggest that repeated glances suffice to remember
the objects of our environment.
Introduction
We are not only able to identify tens of thousands
of objects, from cups to cruisers, but we are also able
to remember particular instances of such objects, such
as the cup that is on my desk. The objects that popu-
late the many environments we are familiar with seem
to be learned effortlessly, can be recognized after inci-
dental exposure (e.g., Castelhano & Henderson, 2005),
and yet most may have received no more than an oc-
casional glance. When objects are shown for the dura-
tion of a single fixation (about 250 ms; see e.g., Rayner,
1998) or less, those objects are readily processed (e.g.,
Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Potter, 1975),
but the resulting memories are fleeting, decaying after
a few seconds and disappearing almost completely after
a few minutes (e.g., Endress & Potter, 2012; Intraub,
1980; Potter, Staub, Rado, & O’Connor, 2002; Potter,
Staub, & O’Connor, 2004). Yet, the same objects are
remembered in detail when looked at for three seconds
(e.g., Brady et al., 2008).
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How do we transform the fleeting memories resulting
from single fixations into stable long-term memories?
While observers sometimes fixate objects multiple times
(e.g., Castelhano, Mack, & Henderson, 2009), they still
have to integrate those glimpses into stable LTM repre-
sentations. Moreover, the time during which an object
is projected onto our retina is clearly not the only deter-
minant of the stability or even existence of the resulting
memory.
For example, observers famously fail to notice a go-
rilla in full view when they are attending to other as-
pects of a display (Drew, VA˜t¸, & Wolfe, 2013; Simons &
Chabris, 1999) and, at least in statistical learning tasks,
observer do not appear to learn anything about those
items they do not attend to (Toro, Sinnett, & Soto-
Faraco, 2005; Turk-Browne, Junge´, & Scholl, 2005).
Conversely, even very brief presentations can yield rel-
atively good memory when viewers attend to them and
continue to think about them. For example, presenting
pictures for just 110 ms followed by a blank screen for
5,890 ms yields comparable memory to a full 6 s presen-
tation, at least after a retention interval of a few minutes
(Intraub, 1980).
If fleeting memories need to be consolidated into more
stable ones, there is a second complication, reflected
in the long and ongoing history of controversy about
the relation between short-term memory (STM) and
LTM. The modal model of memory developed in the
1960’s held that LTM representations need to be con-
solidated from STM (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). In
contrast, subsequent evidence suggested dissociations
between STM and LTM: patients like HM could not
form new LTM representations despite relatively spared
STM (Scoville & Milner, 1957), and patients like KF
could form novel LTM representations despite impaired
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(verbal) STM (Shallice & Warrington, 1970), leading to
the view that STM and LTM might be independent and
dissociable (e.g., Baddeley, 2001; Brady, Konkle, & Al-
varez, 2011; Cowan, 2008; Luck, 2007; Sternberg, 2009;
see also Craik & Lockhart, 1972, for a compilation of
traditional differences between long-term memory and
short-term memory).
In fact, there would be an important design reason for
a dedicated STM system that is independent of LTM:
speed of access. For example, even with memory sets
as small as 4 to 16 items, there is a noticeable delay in
accessing memory items that increases with the size of
the memory set (Wolfe, 2012). Given the large capacity
of LTM (Brady et al., 2008) (that might, in the case of
the mental lexicon, comprise more than 50,000 words;
see e.g., Pinker, 1999), it is easy to see how access to
LTM might be too slow for manipulating mental repre-
sentations. However, if LTM and STM are indeed inde-
pendent, it is unclear how we can come to recognize the
objects that populate our environments, as we should
not be able to transform the fleeting memories resulting
from glimpses into stable LTM representations.
While the dominant view is arguably that STM and
LTM are independent and dissociable, other authors
have proposed STM and LTM to form a continuum (e.g.,
Crowder, 1993; Greene, 1986; Wickelgren, 1973; Nairne,
2002; see Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005, for a recent
review).
Here, we thus ask whether (and how readily) repeated
but intermittent exposure to objects for durations of
single fixations transforms fleeting STM representations
into more stable LTM representations. It is well es-
tablished since the onset of experimental psychology
(Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913) that, once an item is in LTM,
repeated exposure increases its memory strength and
delays its forgetting. It is not clear, however, whether,
and how readily, fleeting STM representations would
lead to stable LTM representations. In fact, there are
reasons to think that brief intermittent exposure might
not lead to stable LTM representations. For exam-
ple, Subramaniam, Biederman, and Madigan (2000) pre-
sented participants with rapid sequences of line drawings
of objects for a duration of 72 or 126 ms per picture.
Prior to each sequence, participants were given an object
name and were instructed to report after the sequence
whether that object had appeared in the sequence. Im-
portantly, the items in the sequences were repeated,
such that participants had (briefly) seen each picture
between 0 and 31 times as nontargets, before that object
was used as a target. Subramaniam et al. (2000) found
no evidence that detection performance improved as a
function of how often the targets had been briefly seen
before. Yet when target images were presented for 5 s
at the beginning of the experiment (arguably sufficient
for LTM), detection performance improved.1
At first sight, these results seem to suggest an-
other dissociation between LTM and STM: Repeated
exposure clearly improves LTM retention (Ebbinghaus,
1885/1913), while Subramaniam et al.’s (2000) results
seem to suggest that this might not be the case for STM.
However, in the latter study, participants were actively
searching for a target, which, in turn, might have lim-
ited how much they remembered of the items, just as
observers can fail to remember having viewed a gorilla
when they were busy attending to other aspects of a dis-
play. Perhaps if participants were simply viewing items
without a search task, memory would improve with rep-
etition.
In fact, there are other reasons to think that STM
might be consolidated across views. For example,
Pertzov, Avidan, and Zohary (2009) presented partic-
ipants with an array of objects, and measured short-
term retention of the objects as a function of how often
they had been fixated. Results showed that objects were
remembered better when they had been fixated more of-
ten. However, while these results suggest that, within
STM, memory can be strengthened by multiple views,
they leave open the question of whether such strength-
ening would occur over longer retention intervals as well.
Likewise, Melcher (2001) found that memory for objects
improved if participants were shown a scene containing
many objects repeatedly for 0.25, 1, or 2 s, and if they
had to recall objects from the scene after each presen-
tation. He proposed that the memory was an inter-
mediate form of memory, between STM and LTM (see
also Melcher & Kowler, 2001; Melcher, 2006). However,
these results leave open the question of whether memory
consolidation would also occur with the shortest presen-
tation durations if the presentation were not followed by
a recall period; after all, this period gives participants
additional processing time even after the retinal image
had disappeared, and it is well known that repeated re-
call leads to improved memory even when the memory
items are presented only once (e.g., Erdelyi & Becker,
1974).
Here, we investigate directly whether repeated brief
exposure to objects can transform fleeting STM repre-
sentations into more stable LTM representations. Ex-
periment 1 comprised two parts. In each trial of the first
part, participants were presented with a sequence of 12
pictures of everyday objects for a duration of 250 ms
per picture. A test picture followed: participants had to
1 In a different condition, Subramaniam et al. (2000)
showed that priming occurred even with a 72 ms presen-
tation, provided that the prime was designated as the target
on that trial and was followed by a 3 s interval before the
sequence began. However, and as mentioned above, Intraub
(1980) showed that presenting an item for 110 ms followed by
a 5,890 ms blank screen yields comparable memory perfor-
mance to presenting the item for 6,000 ms. In line with these
results, we thus propose that the priming Subramaniam et
al. (2000) observed under these conditions might not have
been due to the brief presentation per se, but rather to the
time available to process the stimuli during the presentation
and the following blank interval.
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decide whether it had been part of the sequence. Impor-
tantly, most pictures were shown only once throughout
the experiment, but a subset appeared in 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16
trials, with repetitions separated by three to seven other
trials (each with 12 pictures), equivalent to an average
delay of about 50 s. The repeated items were never used
as test items in the first part.
In the second part of the experiment, we tested par-
ticipants’ LTM for these repeated pictures (including the
subset that was presented only once and not repeated).
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, except that
items were repeated only for up to 8 times, and that we
also tested the effect of the retention interval between
the last presentation of an item and the later LTM test.
To foreshadow our results, Experiments 1 and 2 re-
vealed better long-term retention when items were re-
peated more often. In Experiment 3, we tested two
critical issues arising from these results. First, other
studies using shorter presentation durations did not find
memory consolidation; we thus asked whether items pre-
sented more briefly would yield a memory benefit, and
whether this benefit was reduced compared to longer
presentation durations. Second, we asked whether long-
term memory retention was simply a function of the
total presentation time.
Finally, in Experiment 4, we compared the behavior
with pictorial stimuli from Experiments 1 to 3 to that
with verbal stimuli, for two important reasons. First,
there is substantial evidence that (short-term) memory
for verbal items is independent of other forms of memory
(e.g., Baddeley, 1996, 2003; Endress & Potter, 2012).
Further, while repeatedly recalling pictorial stimuli im-
proves recall performance for the memory items, this
does not seem to be the case for words (e.g., Erdelyi &
Becker, 1974). Hence, it is possible that words would
behave differently from pictures in the experiments out-
lined above. Second, and crucially, the problem par-
ticipants faced in Experiment 4 is different from that
in Experiments 1 to 3. In Experiments 1 to 3, par-
ticipants had to construct novel LTM representations,
and to decide later on whether or not they had ever
seen the test items. In Experiment 4, in contrast, par-
ticipants had pre-existing LTM representations for the
words they were presented with (otherwise they would
have been non-words). Hence, during the LTM test, par-
ticipants had to distinguish between words they knew
and saw during the experiment, and words they knew
but had not seen during the experiment. As a result, it
is possible that this latter task might be somewhat more
difficult than that in Experiments 1 to 3.
General methods
Participants
We recruited 48 participants (9, 8 and 8 females in
Experiments 1 to 3, mean age 24.2) from the MIT com-
munity, sequentially assigned to Experiments 1 to 3. An
additional 18 participants (11 females, mean age 22.2)
were recruited for Experiment 4; we retained only the
first 16 for analysis to keep the number of participants
constant across experiments.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a NEC MultiSync FE700+
17” CRT (refresh rate: 75 Hz; resolution: 640 × 480),
using the Matlab psychophysics toolbox (Version 3.0.8;
Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Responses were collected
from pre-marked “Yes” and “No” keys on the keyboard.
Materials
Stimuli in Experiments 1 to 3 were color photographs
of familiar everyday objects taken from Brady et al.
(2008). Stimuli were randomly selected for each partic-
ipant from a set of 2,400 pictures. They were presented
subtending a visual angle of 12.7 × 12.7 degrees.
Stimuli in Experiment 4 were words. We selected
2381 nouns from the CELEX database (a frequency
database for English words) with the constraints that
each noun (i) had between 4 and 10 letters; (ii) had one
or two syllables; (iii) had a minimum frequency of 100 of
out 17.9 million words; (iv) was unique in the final list
(e.g., words that differed only in plural markers were
removed); (v) was not specific to British English; (vi)
was not a proper noun; (vii) was not a swear word or
otherwise offensive. Words were presented in a font size
of 22 in Courier lower-case font.
Experiment 1
Methods
In the first part of the experiment, participants
started each trial by a key-press; after a fixation cross,
12 pictures were presented for a duration of 250 ms per
picture. 1.5 s after the sequence the test picture was
presented for 800 ms. “Old” test items (those that oc-
curred in the sample sequence) were randomly sampled
from two initial, two final and two middle positions, ex-
cluding the first and last pictures. “New”test items were
presented on 50% of the trials.
There were 50 critical pictures that were presented in
1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 trials each (hereafter called the “repeated
pictures” even though 10 were presented only once).
None of the repeated pictures were tested immediately
after the sequence, and participants were not informed
that pictures would be repeated or that there would be
a later memory test of some of the items. There was
a total of 132 trials. Trials were organized into 5 start
trials, 30 end trials, and 97 central trials. The repeated
pictures were presented only in the central trials. Pic-
ture repetitions were separated by five intervening trials
on average (minimum: 3; maximum 7), corresponding
on average to a delay of about 50 s. Serial position in
the sequence was counterbalanced within each number
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of repetitions; the repeated pictures were never in the
first or last serial position.
In the second part of Experiment 1, participants were
tested on their memory of the repeated pictures. They
were shown all 50 repeated pictures (10 items × 5 num-
bers of repetitions) mixed with 50 novel pictures, pre-
sented one at a time. For each picture, participants
indicated whether or not they had seen it before in the
experiment. We unconfounded the number of repeti-
tions and the memory delay by controlling the last ap-
pearance of the memory items during the first phase of
the experiment. In the first phase, the last presentation
of all critical items was within a range of 6 trials. As a
result, the delay between the last presentation of a given
picture and when it was tested in the second phase was
unrelated to the number of repetitions.
Results and discussion
In the immediate memory test of the first part of Ex-
periment 1, participants performed well above chance
(M = 75.8%, SD = 4.9%; Figure 1a), t(15) = 21.2, p <
.0001, Cohen’s d = 5.3. Using the two-high threshold
formula for estimating memory capacity (e.g., Cowan,
2001; Rouder et al., 2008), this performance corresponds
to a capacity of 6.2.
In the LTM test in the second part, participants were
not above chance when the picture had been presented
only once (M = 54.1%; SD = 9.0%; Figure 1 and Table
1), suggesting that a single fixation is rarely sufficient
to establish a stable long-term memory.
However, when the critical items were repeated, long-
term retention improved such that, after 8 repetitions,
participants’ LTM performance was equivalent to that
in the immediate tests in the first part, and after 16 rep-
etitions, LTM performance exceeded performance on the
immediate memory test (see Table 1). The LTM results
were analyzed using a logistic mixed-effects model with
the number of repetitions as a linear predictor. We ob-
served an effect of the number of repetitions, β = .085,
Z = 7.6, p < .0001, suggesting that LTM retention im-
proved when items were repeated more often.
Experiment 2
Method
In Experiment 2, we investigated the temporal stabil-
ity of newly created LTM representations. Experiment 2
was similar to Experiment 1, with two exceptions. First,
due to the limited set of available pictures, items were
repeated only up to 8 times. Second, and crucially, we
included a manipulation of the retention delay. Specifi-
cally, as in Experiment 1, the first part of Experiment 2
measured short-term retention of the items. This part
included 156 trials that were organized into five start tri-
als, four end trials, and three central blocks of 49 trials
each. Each central block contained 40 critical pictures
that were presented in 1, 2, 4 or 8 trials each, and whose
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Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1. The dotted line shows
the average percentage of correct responses during the first
part of Experiment 1 with an immediate test. The shaded re-
gion around it represents the associated SEM. The solid line
shows the percentage of correct responses in the second part
of Experiment 1 as a function of the number of repetitions.
Error bars represent SEM.
long-term retention would be tested in the second part.
Constraints on the number of intervening trials between
repetitions of a picture as well as on the serial positions
of the repeated pictures were as in Experiment 1.
The central blocks were used to manipulate the re-
tention interval by inverting the order of appearance of
the blocks between Parts 1 and 2. Specifically, in Part 2,
long-term retention was tested first for items from Block
3, and last for items from Block 1. As a result, the re-
tention interval was longest for items from the Block
1 and shortest for items from the Block 3, making the
variable presentation-block an approximation of the re-
tention interval. The average delay between the most
recent presentation and the test was 3 min 50 s (SE =
11 s) for Block 3, 16 min 19 s (SE = 1 min 6 s) for Block
2, and 29 min 55 s (SE = 2 min 54 s) for Block 1. The
blocks were presented in a continuous sequence of trials,
without breaks.
The second part of Experiment 2 comprised 240 test
pictures (120 repeated pictures, 120 novel foils).
Results
In the immediate memory test in the first part of
Experiment 2, participants again performed well above
chance (M = 75.3%, SD = 7.3%; Figure 2), t = 13.8, p <
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Table 1
Percentage of correct responses and associated t-tests as a function of the number of repetitions in the second part
of each experiment and of the block (Experiment 2 only; Block 3 corresponds to the shortest retention delay while
Block 1 corresponds to the longest one). The first t-test is evaluated against the chance level of 50%. The second
t-test is a paired t-test comparing the performance in the first part to the performance in the second part for the
different blocks and numbers of repetitions.
Against chance level of 50% Against 1st part performance
Block # Repet. M SD t(15) p Cohen’s d t(15) p Cohen’s d
Experiment 1 (second part)
— 1 54.1 9.0 1.8 .091 .45 10.4 <.0001 2.6
— 2 57.5 8.8 3.4 .0038 .86 6.6 <.0001 1.7
— 4 70.9 12.3 6.8 <.0001 1.7 1.5 .155 .4
— 8 75.9 9.3 11.1 <.0001 2.8 .1 .941 .02
— 16 80.3 10.4 11.6 <.0001 2.9 2.3 .038 .57
Experiment 2 (second part)
3 1 55.6 11.2 2.0 .064 .5 7.2 <.0001 1.8
3 2 61.9 14.4 3.3 .005 .83 4.3 .0007 1.1
3 4 67.2 15.2 4.5 .0004 1.1 2.3 .035 .58
3 8 73.4 13.3 7.1 <.0001 1.8 .6 .543 .16
2 1 56.6 9.6 2.7 .016 .68 7.3 <.0001 1.8
2 2 57.5 9.5 3.2 .006 .79 6.5 .0001 1.6
2 4 65.0 15.8 3.8 .002 .95 3.1 .008 .76
2 8 72.8 11.5 7.9 <.0001 2.0 .8 .415 .21
1 1 54.1 12.0 1.3 .196 .34 7.0 <.0001 1.7
1 2 52.8 8.6 1.3 .208 .33 9.9 <.0001 2.5
1 4 61.2 12.0 3.7 .002 .93 4.0 .001 1.0
1 8 70.9 10.2 8.2 <.0001 2.1 1.8 .088 .46
Experiment 3 (second part)
— 1 49.4 6.8 .4 .718 .10 9.6 <.0001 2.4
— 3 55.6 8.3 2.7 .017 .67 4.4 .0005 1.1
— 6 54.7 10.7 1.8 .101 .44 4.7 .0003 1.2
— 12 60.9 10.4 4.2 .0007 1.1 2.5 .025 .62
— 24 61.6 13.1 3.5 .003 .88 2.1 .053 .53
Experiment 4 (second part)
3 1 53.75 11.0 1.36 0.194 0.34 5.8 <.0001 1.5
3 2 54.69 12.3 1.52 0.149 0.38 6.18 <.0001 1.5
3 4 55 10.5 1.91 0.076 0.48 6.41 <.0001 1.6
3 8 63.44 13.7 3.91 0.001 0.98 4.02 0.001 1.0
2 1 55 10.6 1.88 0.08 0.47 6.94 <.0001 1.7
2 2 53.12 5.7 2.18 0.0457 0.54 7.11 <.0001 1.8
2 4 53.12 10.5 1.19 0.251 0.3 7.28 <.0001 1.8
2 8 53.44 10 1.38 0.187 0.35 6.12 <.0001 1.5
1 1 53.44 9.6 1.43 0.173 0.36 7.04 <.0001 1.8
1 2 52.5 13.2 0.76 0.459 0.19 5.77 <.0001 1.4
1 4 56.56 12.9 2.04 0.06 0.51 4.35 0.0006 1.1
1 8 59.06 12.9 2.8 0.01 0.7 4.74 0.0003 1.2
.0001, Cohen’s d = 3.5. Using the two-high threshold
formula for estimating memory capacity (e.g., Cowan,
2001; Rouder et al., 2008), this performance corresponds
to a capacity of 6.1.
In the LTM test in the second part, participants per-
formed at or close to chance when the picture had been
presented only once (M = 55.6%, SD = 11.2%; Figure 2
and Table 1), suggesting again that a single fixation is
rarely sufficient to establish a stable long-term memory.
However, when the critical items were repeated, long-
term retention improved such that, after 8 repetitions,
participants’ LTM performance was indistinguishable
from the immediate tests in the first part (see Table 1).
The LTM results were analyzed using a logistic mixed-
effects model with linear predictors of block and of num-
ber of repetitions as well as their interaction. Only the
two main effects contributed to the model likelihood. As
in Experiment 1, we observed a significant main effect of
number of repetitions, β = .11, Z = 8.5, p < .0001, sug-
gesting again that LTM retention improved when items
were repeated more often. Further, we observed a sig-
nificant main effect of block (i.e., our proxy for the re-
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2. The dotted line shows
the average percentage of correct responses during the first
part of Experiment 2 with the immediate test. The shaded
region around it represents the associated SEM. The other
lines show the percentage of correct responses in the second
part of Experiment 2 as a function of block and the number
of repetitions. The block number is given relative to the first
part of the experiment, and the order of blocks was inverted
in the second part. The solid line represents the performance
in Block 3 (average delay between the most recent presenta-
tion and the test, 3 min 50 s, SE = 11 s), the dashed line the
performance in Block 2 (average delay 16 min 19 s, SE = 1
min 6 s), and the dash-dotted line the performance in Block
1 (average delay 29 min 55 s, SE = 2 min 54 s). Error bars
represent SEM.
tention interval), β = .11, Z = 2.5, p = .011, suggesting
that LTM retention decreased with increasing memory
delay, as seen in Figure 2b.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 yielded two crucial re-
sults. First, repeating items more often allows par-
ticipants to consolidate fleeting STM traces into more
durable LTM representations. When items were pre-
sented only once, virtually no long-term retention was
observed; when they were presented 8 times, long-term
retention performance was indistinguishable from an im-
mediate memory test. This is not to say that a single
presentation might not yield memory traces that might
be detectable by more sensitive methods. In fact, if the
fleeting memories disappeared immediately, it is hard to
see how additional exposure could possibly help stabi-
lizing them. Rather, these results show that brief ex-
posure to an item yields memory traces that diminish
in strength so rapidly that they cannot be detected by
a recognition task a few minutes later; this temporal
dynamic is arguably a quality that is usually associ-
ated with STM. Crucially, additional exposure stabilizes
these fleeting memories so that they can be detected
about half an hour later, which, in turn, is a quality
associated with LTM.
The second crucial result of Experiments 1 and 2 is
that long-term retention performance declined with in-
creased retention intervals. This raises the question of
whether the performance decrement was due to decay
or interference, or both. In fact, interference might well
play a crucial role in long-term forgetting (e.g., Brown,
Neath, & Chater, 2007; see also Melcher & Murphy,
2011), which, in turn, does not exclude the possibility
that decay might also be a factor in forgetting (e.g.,
Hollingworth, 2005). While the current experiments do
not allow us to decide whether the reduction in long-
term retention after longer intervals was due to decay,
interference or both, experiments using the same stim-
uli as those employed here suggest that, at least in the
short-term domain, decay might play a role. Specifi-
cally, in Endress and Potter’s (2014) Experiment 4, par-
ticipants were presented with a task similar to Part 1
of Experiments 1 and 2. Crucially, participants were
tested either after a 1.5 s retention interval or after a
7.5 s retention interval. Participants performed worse
after the 7.5 s delay than after the 1.5 s delay. As
the only difference between the delay conditions was the
duration of a progress bar participants viewed between
the end of the sample sequence and the test item, it is
plausible to attribute this difference to decay. If these
results scale up to long-term retention, one would expect
a role of memory decay in long-term retention as well, in
conjunction with interference from viewing many other
images before seeing the test images.
However, the combined results of Experiments 1
and 2 raise two crucial questions. First, given that
a prior study with shorter presentation durations
(Subramaniam et al., 2000) found no priming benefit for
repeated items, we asked whether we would observe any
memory consolidation with briefer presentations. Sec-
ond, we asked whether the total viewing time would pre-
dict long-term retention, or whether it would be modu-
lated by the presentation duration. We thus presented
items for 133 ms each, but repeated them up to 24 times.
As a result, for the largest number of repetitions, both
the total viewing time and the number of repetitions
was larger than in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 3
Methods
The design of Experiment 3 was based on that of Ex-
periment 2, except that the same items were repeated
across blocks. As a result, the critical items were pre-
sented 1, 3, 6, 12 or 24 times. Further, we included an
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additional 24 end trials (28 in total), so that the long-
term retention test would not start immediately after
the last presentation of the memory items. Crucially,
items were presented for 133 ms per picture rather than
250 ms.
Results
Results of Experiment 3. In the immediate memory
test of the first part of Experiment 3, participants per-
formed well above chance (M= 67.7%, SD= 7.1%; Fig-
ure 3), t(15) = 10.0, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 2.5, CI.95 =
64.0, 71.5. Using the two-high threshold formula for es-
timating memory capacity (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Rouder
et al., 2008), this performance corresponds to a capacity
of 4.2.
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 3. The dotted line shows
the average percentage of correct responses during the first
part of Experiment 3 with an immediate test. The shaded re-
gion around it represents the associated SEM. The solid line
shows the percentage of correct responses in the second part
of Experiment 3 as a function of the number of repetitions.
Error bars represent SEM.
In the LTM test in the second part, participants were
not above chance when the picture had been presented
only once (M = 49.4%; SD = 6.8%; Figure 3 and Table
1), suggesting that a single fixation is rarely sufficient
to establish a stable long-term memory.
However, when the critical items were repeated, long-
term retention gradually improved. In contrast to Ex-
periments 1 and 2, however, LTM performance never
reached the level of the immediate memory test (see
Table 1).
The LTM results were analyzed using a logistic
mixed-effects model with the number of repetitions as a
linear predictor. We observed an effect of the number
of repetitions, β = .019, Z = 3.1, p = .002, suggesting
that LTM retention improved when items were repeated
more often.
Comparison with Experiment 1. We compared Exper-
iment 3 to Experiment 1 for three reasons. First, both
experiments comprised only a single block of items. Sec-
ond, both experiments had a similar number of end trials
(30 in Experiment 1 vs. 28 in Experiment 3), making
the memory delay roughly comparable, although it was
slightly shorter in Experiment 3, due to both the smaller
number of end trials and to the shorter presentation du-
ration. Third, the maximal number of repetitions as
well as the maximal total viewing duration were greater
in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1.
We compared Experiments 1 and 3 in two ways.
First, we compared performance on the immediate re-
tention task. Participants in Experiment 1 (M = 75.8%)
performed better than in Experiment 3 (M = 67.7%),
t(30) = 3.73, p = .0008, Cohen’s d = 1.32.
Second, we asked whether the speed of learning was
different across Experiments 1 and 3, and whether LTM
retention differed across the experiments. The data
points we used as a proxy for long-term retention were
the performance for items repeated 8 times in Experi-
ment 1 (M = 75.9%, SD = 9.3%), and for those repeated
24 times in Experiment 3 (M = 61.6%, SD = 13.1%).
As a result, the items from Experiment 3 were presented
both more often than in Experiment 1 (24 vs. 8 times)
and for a longer total presentation duration (3.2 s vs.
2 s). Hence, if we observe an impairment in long-term
retention performance with the shorter presentation du-
ration, this impairment occurred despite more repeti-
tions and a longer total duration. We thus submitted
the data to an ANOVA with the between-subjects pre-
dictor presentation duration (i.e., Experiment 1 vs. 3)
and the within-subject predictor number of repetitions
(i.e., 1 vs. 8 repetitions for Experiment 1 and 1 vs. 24
repetitions for Experiment 3).
The analysis revealed a main effect of presentation
duration, F (1,30) = 11.2, p = .002, η2p = .271, as well
as of the number of repetitions, F (1,30) = 73.4, p <
.0001, η2p = .671. Crucially, the two factors interacted,
F (1,30) = 5.9, p = .021, η2p = .0543.
This interaction can be interpreted in two ways.
First, separate ANOVAs for the different numbers of
repetitions (once vs. more than once) revealed no dif-
ference between Experiments 1 and 3 when items were
presented only once, F (1,30) = 2.8, p = 0.107, η2p =
0.08, but a sizable difference when items were repeated
more than once, F (1,30) = 12.7, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.298.
Hence, even though total viewing time and number of
repetitions were both greater in Experiment 3, long-
term memory performance was worse.
Second, separate ANOVAs for the two presentation
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durations with the within-subject factor number of repe-
titions revealed that the difference between performance
for items presented only once and items presented more
than once was larger in Experiment 1 (average dif-
ference: 21.9%, SE = 3.0%), F (1,15) = 54.9, p <
.0001, η2p= 0.785, than in Experiment 3 (average differ-
ence: 12.2%, SE = 2.7%), F (1,15) = 21.0, p= 0.0004,
η2p = 0.583, suggesting that LTM memory consolidation
was better in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 3 even
though total viewing time and number of repetitions
were both greater in Experiment 3.
Discussion
Experiment 3 yielded three crucial results. First, and
as in Experiments 1 and 2, long-term retention was poor
or non-existent when items were presented once, and im-
proved when items were presented more often. Hence,
Experiment 3 further supports the idea that fleeting
memories can be transformed into more stable memory
representations simply by presenting items more often.
Second, both the absolute level of long-term retention
and the benefit for each additional repetition were re-
duced for shorter presentation durations. These results
suggest that the stabilization of memories is graded and
depends on how strong the memory representations were
in the first place. Hence, it is possible that, with still
shorter presentation durations, no long-term retention
at all might be observed.
Third, our results show that the total time during
which an item has been viewed is a poor predictor of
long-term retention, although it can be a good predic-
tor with somewhat longer durations or extra processing
time (e.g., Melcher, 2001). As mentioned above, long-
term retention after 24 repetitions in Experiment 3 was
substantially worse than long-term retention after 8 rep-
etitions in Experiment 1, although both the number of
repetitions and the total viewing durations were greater.
Hence, retention is not a monotonic function of the time
during which an item has been viewed, suggesting that
there might be some “leakage” when integrating very
weak memory representations over time. These results
thus further support the idea that the benefit of each ad-
ditional repetition of a stimulus depends on the strength
with which the stimulus has been represented in the first
place.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, we further extend the results of Ex-
periments 1 to 3 by asking whether similar results can
be found with verbal stimuli. As mentioned before, the
objective of this experiment was (i) to establish that
intermittent repetitions of verbal stimuli improve LTM
retention, and (ii) to test whether pre-existing LTM rep-
resentations might impair recognition memory.
Method
Experiment 4 was similar to Experiment 2, with two
exceptions. First, we used words rather than pictures as
stimuli. Second, stimuli were presented for a duration of
147 ms per word, as pilot experiments revealed that this
presentation duration yielded a comparable short-term
level of retention to that of Experiment 2.
Results and discussion
In the immediate memory test in the first part of
Experiment 4, participants again performed well above
chance (M = 74.0%, SD = 8.6%; Figure 4), t = 11.2,
p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 2.8. This result was similar to
the Part 1 results of Experiment 2. In the LTM test
in the second part, participants performed at or close
to chance when the word had been presented only once
(M = 53.4%, SD = 9.6%; Figure 4 and Table 1), sug-
gesting again that a single fixation is not sufficient for
recognizing items after a retention time of a few minutes.
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Figure 4. Results of Experiment 4. The dotted line shows
the average percentage of correct responses during the first
part of Experiment 4 with an immediate test. The shaded
region around it represents the associated SEM. The solid
line represents the long-term retention performance in Block
3 (average delay between the most recent presentation and
the test, 3 min 9 s, SE = 7 s), the dashed line the performance
in Block 2 (average delay 12 min 27 s, SE = 19 s), and the
dash-dotted line the performance in Block 1 (average delay
22 min 17 s, SE = 39 s). Error bars represent SEM.
When the critical items were repeated, LTM reten-
tion gradually improved, and differed from chance per-
formance when items were repeated 8 times. However,
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LTM performance remained substantially worse than
performance in the short-term retention task even with
8 repetitions (see Table 1).
The LTM results were analyzed using a logistic
mixed-effects model with linear predictors of block and
of number of repetitions as well as their interactions.
Only the two main effects contributed to the model
likelihood. We observed a significant main effect of
the number of repetitions, β = 0.029, Z = 2.41, p =
0.016, suggesting again that LTM retention improved
when items were repeated more often. The main effect
of block did not reach significance, β = .027, Z = .68,
p = .50, ns.
The combined LTM results of Experiments 2 and 4
were analyzed using a logistic mixed-effects model with
linear predictors of experiment, block and of number
of repetitions as well as their interactions. We observed
significant main effects of the number of repetitions, β =
.029 Z = 2.67, p = .0075, and of block, β = 0.064, Z =
2.24, p = .025. We also observed an interaction between
the number of repetitions and the experiment, β = 0.082
Z = 6.02, p < .0001, suggesting that LTM performance
increased more as a function of the number of repetitions
in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 4.
As mentioned above, the reduced benefit of repeating
words as compared to pictures might be due to the fact
that all words were known before the experiment; hence,
participants needed to discriminate known items that
have been seen recently from known items that have not,
while participants in Experiments 1 to 3 just needed to
discriminate known items from unknown items. This,
in turn, might have made the LTM retention task in
Experiments 1 and 2 easier.
General discussion
The present results reveal that repeatedly seeing ob-
jects for the duration of a single fixation transforms fleet-
ing STMs into more stable LTM traces. After seeing
an object once for the duration of a single fixation, al-
most no LTM retention was observed. Further, previous
research has shown that these fleeting memories start
decaying within seconds (Endress & Potter, 2012, 2014;
Intraub, 1980; Potter et al., 2002, 2004), suggesting that
they are firmly in the domain of STM.
In contrast, after seeing an object for just eight
250-ms durations (with each presentation separated by
about 1 min and the viewing of about 60 other pictures),
recognition performance 30 minutes later was indistin-
guishable from an immediate test, and in Experiment 1,
LTM recognition performance exceeded an immediate
memory test after 16 repetitions. However, when the
presentation duration was reduced to 133 ms per pic-
ture, LTM built up more slowly. We suggest that re-
peatedly viewing objects in the environment, even for
durations of single fixations, gradually builds up LTM
representations, and allows us to recognize the tens of
thousands of objects we know. The speed of the built-up
might depend on various factors, including the strength
of the initial representation, whether or not items are
attended, and other factors. Moreover, the results of
Experiment 2 show that these initial LTM representa-
tions show some degree of loss over tens of minutes, a
decline that might plausibly continue over longer reten-
tion intervals (Nairne, 1992).
Our and previous results lend support to the idea
that there is a continuum between STM and LTM (see
Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005 for a recent review). In
fact, the best-accepted dissociations between LTM and
STM are that “only short-term memory [demonstrates]
(1) temporal decay and (2) chunk capacity limits” (e.g.,
Cowan, 2008). However, both dissociations might need
to be revised. First, while LTM is thought to be rela-
tively stable over time, the current and previous results
(e.g., Nairne, 1992) show that there is still temporal
decay. Second, the capacity of STM might actually be
larger than has been assumed, and the capacity limita-
tions traditionally attributed to STM might be an effect
of proactive interference. Specifically, Endress and Pot-
ter (2014) presented participants with rapid sequences of
pictures or words, and showed that participants briefly
retain a certain proportion of the presented items rather
than a fixed number of items (e.g., about 30 pictures out
of 100 pictures), and that this proportion is relatively in-
dependent of the number of presented items. The lim-
ited memory capacity that is thought to be characteris-
tic of STM arose only under conditions of strong proac-
tive interference.2 Hence, in contrast to the widely held
view about differences between STM and LTM, LTM
might undergo decay, and STM might have a large ca-
pacity. Together with the current ones, such results thus
raise the possibility that STM and LTM might form a
continuum, with short-lasting memories for brief stimuli
constituting a fragile form of long-term memory.
However, this continuum might take one of two forms.
First, STM and LTM might reflect the same psycholog-
ical construct. Second, STM and LTM representations
might be distinct but be created in parallel, with the
initial stages of LTM representations having very sim-
2 Endress and Potter (2014) manipulated proactive inter-
ference by presenting participants either with objects that
would appear only in a single trial, or by using the same set of
objects throughout all trials. When objects are trial-unique,
proactive interference should be minimized. In contrast,
when objects from the same set of items are used across tri-
als, there should be interference from previous trials, because
participants would have to decide whether they have seen a
given test item in the current trial, or rather in one of the pre-
vious trials. Accordingly, Endress and Potter (2014) found
large memory capacity estimates under low-interference con-
ditions, while capacity estimate remained in the range of
previous working memory estimates in the high-interference
condition. Delayed recognition tests showed that these ini-
tially remembered items began to be forgotten within sec-
onds, and almost all were forgotten within 30 minutes.
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ilar properties to what is usually attributed to STM:
an LTM representation might be generated by a brief
exposure, and might be initially unstable, decaying over
the course of a few seconds or minutes.3 The relative
temporal stability that is the hallmark of LTM items
might be achieved only after repeated or prolonged ex-
posure. Further, the limited capacity that is thought
to be a hallmark of temporary memory systems (e.g.,
Cowan, 2008) might be observable only under condi-
tions of strong proactive interference; otherwise, tempo-
rary memory might have an open-ended capacity sim-
ilar to LTM (Endress & Potter, 2014). As a result, if
STM and LTM are independent, the initial stages of
LTM must have properties that are characteristic both
of LTM (e.g., a large capacity) and of STM (e.g., avail-
ability after brief exposure; susceptibility to decay or
interference).
Be that as it might, our results suggest that brief
exposure to objects results in unstable LTM memory
traces, either because STM and LTM reflect the same
construct, or because the initial stages of LTM represen-
tations have similar properties to STM representations.
Once an initial memory trace is created, repeated but
intermittent fixations of objects might be sufficient to
establish a stable representation of the objects in each
of the thousands of contexts with which we are famil-
iar, building up a detailed knowledge base that enables
us to operate efficiently in the complex environment we
inhabit.
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